See: Restatement 2d § 53 (3) & Vitty v. Eley, 51 N. Y. Appellate Division, 44. 1900.

Facts

Under Restatement 2d § 53 (3) Where an offer of a promise invites acceptance by performance and does not invite a promissory acceptance, the rendering of the invited performance does not constitute an acceptance if before the offeror performs his promise the offeree manifests an intention not to accept. Under Restatement 2d § 53 (3) comment (c) the offeree’s conduct ordinarily constitutes an acceptance in such cases only if he knows of the offer.

JOHN" VITTY, Appellant, v. THOMAS ELEY, Trustee of
School Disteict, No. 16
Appellate Division' of New York Supreme Court, April
Term, 1900{Reported in 51 New York, Appellate Division, 44]

Spring, J. : The defendant is trustee of a school district in the
town of Lockport. In January, 1899, the schoolhouse in this district
was broken into by one Joe White, and a quantity of property stolen
therefrom or destroyed. The trustee, probably by authority of the
citizens o£ the district, although his authority is not in question,
offered a reward of twenty-five dollars "for the arrest and conviction
of the party or parties" who perpetrated the crime. The evidence
shows that White and the plaintiff lived together and were cronies.
White, after breaking into the schoolhouse in the night, returned to
the plaintiff's house bringing with him chalk, flags, window catches,
and other stuff which he had taken from the schoolhouse. He also
had two chickens, evidently stolen, which were eaten in the household.
The plaintiff saw White burn two of these flags and secrete
the other stuff under a board of the floor. White told the plaintiff
not to "say anything about this." The testimony, therefore, shows
that the plaintiff knew that White had stolen this stuff. Later on,
after the reward and with notice of it, he testified that he told the
bartender in the saloon of Mahar & Byrnes that Joe White broke
into the schoolhouse; that Peter Hayes, who was working up the
case, was called in from the back room and the plaintiff voluntarily
told him what he had seen, incriminating White. Hayes contradicted
the plaintiff and said he was called from the back room, and
the following occurred : 'I said, 'I want you to come up to the
sheriff's office and make a statement as to what you know about
breaking into this schoolhouse.' He says, 'I don't know anything
about it; I was home in bed the night the schoolhouse was broken
into.' I said 'From what I hear, either you or Joe or both of you
went into that schoolhouse.' He said, 'I didn't go in there.' I
said, 'If you don't come up to the sheriff's office and tell what you
know about it, I will swear out a warrant against you.' He said
that if he told what he knew about it, he would have no place to stay.
I said, 'I will find you a place to stay, come with me,' and went
to the courthouse and called the sheriff out. I said, 'This man will
make a statement.' We went into a side room. He said about
what he testified this forenoon." If his version of the transaction is
correct, the plaintiff did not voluntarily give up this information with
the expectation of obtaining the reward, but it was extorted from him
through fear that he might be arrested himself for complicity with
White.

There is considerable contrariety in the decisions as to the real
basis of the right to a reward. It, however, seems to be settled in
this State that it is in the nature of a contract inuring to the benefit
of the person who gives the information. A few principles out of
the conflicting cases I think may be stated, although there is no uniformity
among them.
1. The information must be given with knowledge of the reward.
Fitch V. Snedaker, 38 N. Y. 248; Howland v. Lounds, 51 id. 604.^
I think the evidence warrants the conclusion that plaintiff knew of
the reward, although it is a little shadowy, for apparently he could
not read.
2. As I have suggested, it is a contract obligation. This being
so, it must be the voluntary giving up of the information by the
person. If cork-screwed out of him by threats inducing fear of
prosecution, I take it no recovery could be had. That would destroy
the contract element. In the early English case of Williams v. Carwardine
(4 Barn. & Aid. 621) the question of the motive was held to
be unimportant, but the text writers and American authorities do not
seem to have followed this doctrine strictly, although I find no case
in this State distinctly overruling it. That case cannot be good law
if the liability is contractual, as assent and a voluntary surrender of
the information would be essential.
3. The authorities hold that the information must be imparted
with a view to obtaining the reward. 18 Encyc. of PI. & Pr. 1155;
Hewitt V. Anderson, 56 Cal. 476. And in Holland v. Lounds
{supra) the court says, at page 609 : "That a party claiming a reward
of this character must give some information or do something having
some reference of the reward offered, is very obvious. The action
is, in fact, upon contract. Where a contract is proposed to all the
world, in the form of a proposition, any party may assent to it,
and it is binding, but he cannot assent without knowledge of the
proposition."
In the present case the plaintiff does not claim that there was any
talk between him and Hayes to the effect that he expected any reward.
The information given by the plaintiff was undoubtedly valuable, and
even essential to secure the conviction of White. The justice, however,
on conflicting evidence, or upon inferences properly deducible
from the evidence, has decided adversely to the plaintiff. This decision
implies that he reached the conclusion that the information was
imparted through fear of arrest, or without any expectation of receiving
the reward. The conclusion is supported by the proofs, and we
are not inclined to interfere with the disposition of the case made by
the justice.

The Judgment is affirmed, with costs to the respondent.